The identity principle governing the relationship between the agreeing and the implementing subject offers one approach to an international-law treatment of the financing issue. The identity principle stands for the proposition that States Parties to an agreement must also see to its implementation or guaranteeing, and must inter alia make Academy of Sciences of the German Democratic Republic, Berlin.
financial provisions for specified international control activities. 4 For example, one expression of the identity principle is the fact that the costs of members of the ad hoc settlement commission to be established pursuant to the state complaints procedures embodied in the Anti-Racism and Civil Rights Conventions are to be borne by the parties to the dispute alone.
5
Seen from the perspective of this general principle, the financing arrangement in the Torture Convention represents a very consistent solution. In the debate on Article 18(5) -which, incidentally, was taken word-for-word from a US proposal -it was stressed that UN member states are not legally obliged to finance an institution which, like the CAT, is outside the UN structure.F ull or partial UN financing of the work of the respective monitoring bodies could derive in international law presumably only from the general duty of cooperation in the area of human rights laid upon UN member states by the UN Charter. It is, however, incorrect to assume that only UN financing guarantees the "complete independence" of human rights bodies. After all, the work of the Human Rights Committee has been adversely affected by the withholding of contribution payments by one UN Member state, a state which does not even belong to the Civil Rights Convention.
7 Even more severely, the Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) has suffered due to the UN financial crisis and the outstanding contribution payments of States Parties to the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination; the UN General Assembly has had to address this problem several times. 8 It is perhaps the case that the CERD has been particularly hard hit as a result of the "dual-source" nature of its financing: on practical grounds complete UN financing might have been more advantageous.Â t any rate, it is clear that the guaranteeing of adequate financing is an essential condition for the activity of all international human rights supervisory bodies; and this is specifically true for the CATJO With regard to the financial situation what is important is rational, effective structuring of the monitoring mechanisms in international law, par- ticiilarly of the reporting procedure. The reporting procedure, a mandatory procedure whose importance is often underestimated, should be supported on a priority basis.
During the Working Group's debate on Article 17(7) of the Torture Convention, Ukrainian amendment proposals were withdrawn when the Soviet Union declared that it would recognize the Committee Against Torture and the reporting procedure as mandatory components of the implementation system under the Convention. The Soviet Union did, however, continue to have objections regarding the investigation procedure embodied in Article 20 (8) 
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See CAT/C/2. Annex n. On the last-mentioned provision, Nowak observes: "Such a provision is very difficult to implement and provokes reactions such as the German Democratic Republic's declaration upon ratification that it was only willing to pay for the Committee's activities which it has explicitly recognized"; Nowak, supra note 14, at 495.
declaring that it will not finance activities that it does not accept. The German Democratic Republic will join in financing all other activities of the Committee."!?
This makes it clear that the German Democratic Republic regards the "financial declaration" it made on ratification as a mere interpretive declaration and not as a reservation: it interprets the contribution obligations pursuant to Convention Articles 17(7) and 18(5) to mean that a state is responsible only for those implementation activities that it accepts. But Gomig/Ney advance a different interpretation and regard the German Democratic Republic declaration as a reservation.
18 This once again shows the difficulties of trying to ascertain the "substantive" distinctions between an interpretive declaration and a reservation.
1 ' But even if one views the German Democratic Republic declaration as a reservation, it does not follow that Gomig/Ney's analysis or the objections of Western states 20 may be used to assess its admissibility.
The German Democratic Republic declaration has been termed an inadmissible reservation, the following arguments having been adduced:
1. Accepting the German Democratic Republic's position would prevent the amount of its annual contribution allocation from being calculated.
21
The fact is, though, that the paper prepared by the UN Secretariat on financing the CAT shows costs for procedures pursuant to Articles 20, 21 and 22 separately. I believe it to be totally plausible that cost estimates may be calculated on a case-by-case basis for investigative missions pursuant to Article 20 and settlement procedures pursuant to Article 21. If necessary the credits could be supplied from a special fund to be set up by the States Parties.22 l n that case the German Democratic Republic, for instance, in line with its declaration, would not participate in the establishment of the fund.
The first meeting of States Parties decided to use the UN budget proportions as the scale for allocating costs.
23 Accordingly, the German Democratic Republic presently pays a share of rather more than 4%. To date it has punctually paid the full amount of the sum indicated by the Secretariat for the year concerned (1988 and 1989). These contributions covered the costs of the first two meetings of the States Parties and the first, second and third CAT meetings including, for instance, documentation costs for procedures pur- 
28
For Gomig/Ney, the German Democratic Republic's position, because of "unsecured financing", endangers the effective functioning of the "implementing organ" of the Convention, which for them is of "central importance" ("aim and object" of the Convention).
29 But in reality, as we have seen, the German Democratic Republic's declaration and corresponding practice do not extend to the CAT as such or to the obligatory components of the implementation system of the Convention. They relate only to the the special costs arising from non-mandatory procedures not accepted by the German Democratic Republic, specifically those of Article 20.
Moreover, I regard it as inadmissible in principle to reduce the aim and object of a convention -in this case the Torture Convention -to its international monitoring mechanism (and even further to a few special procedures subject to special agreement!). This mechanism can and should always only make a contribution to implementing the various substantive obligations, and is therefore never an end in itself. And in the case of the Torture Convention, these obligations entail a (far from inconsiderable) clarification and specification of the international (customary) law prohibition on torture, and provisions for its domestic implementation.
30
The German Democratic Republic's declaration is thus, if a reservation at all, an admissible one in every respect 3 f Its effect is that payment obligations arise for the German Democratic Republic only to the extent indicated in the declaration.
3 2 The other States Parties to the Convention are not thereby -as long as they have not themselves made a similar reservation -freed from their own (full) financing responsibilities. This result emerges irrespective of whether states at issue accept or oppose the reservation. In the former case, since the Tortnre Convention follows the pattern of an "integral" multilateral treaty structure, the "reciprocal abridgement of rights" provision of Article 21(l)(b) of the Vienna Convention does not arise. 33 In the event of an objection the question at issue is not regulated by the treaty. 34 Thus customary law governs, and under customary law -which is ultimately reflected in the German Democratic Republic declaration -a state need be responsible only for the costs accepted by it. In my view this can be derived from the principles of sovereign equality as well as from general organizational law.
The other States Parties to the Torture Convention can either accept the German Democratic Republic declaration, or oppose it, thus "cutting out" the corresponding treaty arrangement. 3^ The contracting parties cannot, however, "reinterpret" the content of the declaration or talk the German Democratic Republic into obligations which are in conflict with its expressed will, and this is precisely what the Western states are attempting to do by issuing statements asserting that the German Democratic Republic's declaration is without legal effect and that its (payment) obligations under the treaty remain unaffected. 36 The fact is that the German Democratic Republic need be responsible only for the procedures and costs accepted by it in accordance with the scale of allocation agreed upon by the states. As previously discussed, the German Democratic Republic has so far fully met these obligations. Gomig/Ney essentially arrive at similar conclusions. They therefore recommend that other states enter a qualified objection, thereby preventing the Convention's entry into force with respect of the German Democratic Republic. According to Gomig/Ney, this will "induce" the GDR to withdraw its "unlawful" objection.
38
This is precisely the type of behavior that the International Court of Justice renounced in its 1931 advisory opinion on the Genocide Convention. Given the "purely humanitarian and civilizing purpose** of this Convention, "an objection to a minor reservation" should not prevent a state from being party to it. Yet at the same time, the object of the Convention ought not to be sacrificed merely for the sake of securing as many member states as possible. The ICJ put it this way: "The object and purpose of the [Genocide] Convention thus limit both the freedom of making reservations and that of objecting to them." 3 9
The ICJ advisory opinion on the Genocide Convention was, as is well known, an essential starting-point for the development of the right of reservation in its presently valid form, as fixed in the Vienna Convention. The instrument of reservation, with its inherent flexibility, permits conventions with universal and specifically humanitarian orientations like the Genocide or Torture Conventions to attain universality. Despite all the existing shortcomings of the Vienna Convention provisions on reservations, the principle embodied therein is an important and indispensable component of modem international law in general, and of treaty law in the human rights area in particular.
40 A glance at the practice of states shows that a multitude of reservations have been made on human rights conventions, some of them on far from trivial provisions of a substantive nature, whereas socialist states have consistently made reservations only on procedural provisions.
4 ' The decisive factor on which the admissibility of a reservation rums is whether the content of the reservation contradicts the aim and object of the treaty concerned. 42 If it does not, the reservation is generally admissible. Bringing it down to the general legal policy point: better the ratification of a universal human rights instrument with an ( conduct to date. For example, the US did not ratify the Genocide Convention until four decades after signature and only did so with a reservation that throws the meaning of the ratification into question. 4^ Moreover, ratification of the Torture Convention is still outstanding, as is that of the Covenant on Political and Civil Rights, the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and other important human rights instruments. And here too a range of reservations, including declarations, has been announced. In the case of the Torture Convention, the reservations concern non-recognition of procedures under Articles 20-22, the ICJ procedure, the definition of torture and the characterization of the Treaty as "non-self-executing." 44 The US policy of delaying ratification and issuing multiple reservations while at the same time continually criticizing other states for alleged human rights infringements has rightly met with sharp opposition.
4T
he universal recognition and implementation of the Torture Convention are not endangered by the German Democratic Republic's financial declaration. The German Democratic Republic has become a member of the Convention and of the international-law implementation mechanism accepted by it, and to that extent has assumed responsibilities which it to date has met. The Western states' inappropriately massive campaign against the German Democratic Republic declaration therefore seems risky to me. 4^ It could frighten states away from Convention membership and thus cut into the requisite universality of the Convention. Ultimately, it is better if a state accedes to the Convention and clarifies the extent to which it is prepared (and, as the case may be, simply able) to make financial provisions than for it either to stay away from the Convention or, if a Treaty State, to fail to meet its payment obligations at all. At any rate, objections to a reservation, in this case coming from a relatively small and politically well-defined group of states, cannot impose upon a state any financial obligations that it has publicly declined to assume. Cooperation between states in the area of human rights does, after all, call for respect for sovereign rights, which include the right to make a reservation and the freedom to decide whether or not to accept treaty obligations. 
